

Thant Holds U.A.R. Responsible for 'Direct Confrontation' That Led to Mideast War

REPORT ALSO SAYS ISRAEL BEARS ONUS

Assembly Gets Account of Withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

In 1966 after the Suez canal was originally designed to move into areas of the United Arab Republic that had been occupied by forces of Israel, Britain and France. Later it was ordered to "secure the armistice" along the Israeli-Egyptian border and at Sharm el Sheikh, which controls the Strait of Tiran.

Egyptian troops moved up to the armistice line and into the Sharm el Sheikh area on May 16 and ordered the United Nations troops out of their positions, without prior notice to Mr. Thant. Two days later President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Government called for full withdrawal "as soon as possible" and Mr. Thant complied.

He said that the withdrawal of the force at Cairo's request May 18 "revealed in all its depth and danger the unending conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors which flared into armed hostilities June 5.

But the Secretary General repeated the assertion that there was no Israeli or political base for leaving the 2,400-man peacekeeping force in the position it had occupied for a decade with Egyptian consent.

Replying to critics who have said that Mr. Thant should have submitted a proposal on withdrawal of the force to the General Assembly before acting on Cairo's request, Mr. Thant said: "It is entirely unrealistic to maintain that the conflict would have been solved, or its consequences prevented, if a greater effort had been made to remove U.N.E.F.'s presence in the area against the will of the Government of the United Arab Republic."

Supply Problems Noted

Mr. Thant said not only that it was impossible to supply the United Nations troops with Egyptian cooperation, but also that it was unlikely that the third majority could be obtained in the Assembly for a measure condemning Cairo's refusal to accept the force any longer.

"It is questionable, to say the least, whether the necessary support could have been obtained for such a controversial item," Mr. Thant said.

Mr. Thant said that two of the seven nations that had provided troops for the force, the United Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates, had advised him, upon the United Arab Republic's request for termination, that they were pulling out their troops.

The two countries are known to have been India and Turkey, which took strongly pro-Arab positions in the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The other countries providing troops were Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These nations, plus Colombia and Pakistan, formed the Emergency Force Advisory Committee.

When Mr. Thant informed the committee on May 18 of the decision to comply with the request for withdrawal, Canada, Brazil and Denmark objected but offered no clear alternative.

"In this situation the Secretary General himself did not believe that any useful purpose could be served by his meeting a meeting of either the council or the Assembly," Mr. Thant said in his report.

Council Session Called

Canada called the Security Council into session when the United Arab Republic announced it would prevent passage of the resolution through the Strait of Tiran, the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel's port of Haifa, her gateway to the East.

The controversy over Mr. Thant's response to the United Arab Republic's decision to terminate the Emergency Force is likely to continue despite the heavily documented report.

Israel contends that when she withdrew her troops from the Sinai Peninsula and Sharm el Sheikh in February, 1957, it was on the basis of a pledge from the United States, Britain and France that President Nasser had made a private commitment to "never" again make these areas a cause of controversy.

In a reference to these understandings, Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel said yesterday that the United Arab Republic believed last month that it had "Soviet support for undermining the arrangements, which had been decided in 1957, to make Gaza, Sinai and the Gulf of Aqaba immune from belligerent acts."

Israel sources say that fact was used by the United Arab Republic to live up to private commitments in one way or another, but not accept any commitment in a public commitment by the Arab countries for a long-term peace.

Johnson Nephew Enlists

AUSTIN, Tex., June 26 (AP)—A nephew of President John F. Kennedy, Rodney White of Austin, Tex., enlisted in the United States Navy today to serve for six years, the Austin Naval Reserve Training Center today.

Mr. White, the 21-year-old son of the late Col. and Mrs. William H. White, whose mother was the former Josephine Johnson, the President's sister, according to Navy records.

42 Nations at U.N. Now Urging Israeli Pullback

By BREW MIDDLETON

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., June 27—The demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the United Arab Republic and Jordan now has the public support of 42 delegations, including present and voting members of the United Nations' 122 members.

As a question of importance, adoption would require a two-thirds vote of the delegates present and voting. Diplomats expect a considerable number of abstentions among the United Nations' 122 members.

The United States draft resolution has thus far won the support of 42 nations, including the United States, France, Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan, and many others.

In addition to demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the resolution calls for the establishment of a commission to investigate the aggression and the payment of reparations to the three Arab states.

In addition, 25 of the 42 delegations have called for the withdrawal of the 1949 armistice line or to the positions occupied on the eve of the recent war. One country, Argentina, has made no commitment to the end of the war or to a state of belligerency.

Diplomats said that probably 30 more delegations were prepared to support the resolution, and that this number might grow before the formal vote, which is expected to take place tomorrow.

U.S. AIDS VICTIMS OF MIDEAST WAR

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

The Jordan Department estimates that the number of Arab refugees has increased to approximately 100,000 had crossed the river into eastern Jordan since the start of the war.

The State Department estimates that Arab refugees are still fleeing the action of the 6,000 a day, United States of America, and that the United States is being allocated from the United States of America.

Two Israeli Fliers Are Exchanged for 428 Arabs

By JAMES FERRON

JERICHO, Jordan, June 27—Two Israeli pilots were exchanged today at the Altemy Bridge for 428 Jordanian prisoners and two Iraqi officials.

Somehow, by free transportation offered by the Israelis from Damascus, the Jordanian Red Cross officials handled the exchange of the one-and-a-half-hour prisoner exchange.

The two pilots were first to be released, and then the Jordanian prisoners were released. The Jordanian prisoners were released, and then the Jordanian prisoners were released.

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KOSYGIN TO MEET DE GAULLE AGAIN

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

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President Sunay, in his reply, agreed that the Western nations should work for a detente while at the same time maintaining their own unity.

He said that President de Gaulle was right to insist on the "perils inherent in the (East-West) confrontation."

The Turkish leader alluded to the "perils inherent in the (East-West) confrontation" and expressed the hope that the world could be brought to an end by the "Vietnamese people be able to determine freely their own future."

President Sunay arrived this afternoon for a state visit of four days, the first such visit to the French capital by a Turkish head of state in a century.

Tomorrow President de Gaulle will receive Premier Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, who arrived here today from New York.

The talks are expected to continue through the end of the week, and the French Government has expressed the hope that the world could be brought to an end by the "Vietnamese people be able to determine freely their own future."

Talks Continue in Havana

HAVANA, June 27 (Reuters)—Premier Kosygin resumed talks with Premier Fidel Castro today.

Little information was expected to be given about the talks, but the two men were discussing the situation in Cuba.

Observers here felt that Mr. Castro's radical line, which included criticism of the United States, was a result of the talks.

While the Soviet Union backed by the traditional Latin American Communist parties, was attempting to subvert relations with Venezuela, Colombia and Cuba, the French Government reported revolutionary guerrilla movements trying to overthrow governments of the same countries.

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of withdrawal appear to be well on the way to the two-thirds majority of the 122 members necessary for the adoption of a resolution endorsing the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the United Arab Republic.

As a question of importance, adoption would require a two-thirds vote of the delegates present and voting. Diplomats expect a considerable number of abstentions among the United Nations' 122 members.

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Continued from Preceding Page

88. Following the Secretary General's report, the General Assembly on 2 Feb-

92. The representative of Israel stated at the 592d meeting of the General Assembly, on 23 November 1956:

to its withdrawal?" [Ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/3563, annex I, A, 2.]

General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I). It was, furthermore, the procedure followed by the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of U.N.E.F.

8. In this regard, it should be made entirely clear by the Commander to the

19. In the interests of the force itself and the United Nations, every possible effort should be made to complete the withdrawal as soon as possible, completed during the period of the withdrawal.

The T-55 is one of the latest Soviet tanks. Some captured in

Language and Poetry. Mr. Böll, a native and resident of Cologne, © 1967 IT

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Secretary General's Account of Main Points at Issue' and the Legal Background

Continued from Preceding Page

withdrawal was received. It is also pertinent to note that in response to a query from the Secretary General as to why the United Arab Republic had announced its reestablishment of the blockade in the Strait of Tiran without the Secretary General's consent, Mr. Nasser explained that his Government's decision to resume the blockade had been taken some time before U Thant's departure and it was considered premature for him to make the announcement before rather than after the Secretary General's visit to Cairo.

The Question of Consultations

37. It has been said also that there was not adequate consultation with the organs of the United Nations concerned or with the members before the decision was taken to withdraw the Force. The Secretary General was, and is, firmly of the opinion that the decision for withdrawal of the force, on the request of the Government, rested with the Secretary General after consultation with the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F., which is the organ established by the General Assembly for consultation regarding such matters. This was made clear by Secretary General Hammarskjöld, who took the following position on 18 February 1957 in reply to a question about the withdrawal of the force from Sharm el-Sheikh:

"An indicated procedure procedure would be for the Secretary General to refer the matter to the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 68, document A/3503, annex 2, B, 2.)

The Secretary General consulted the Advisory Committee before replying to the letter of 18 May 1957 and the United Arab Republic requesting withdrawal. This consultation took place within a few hours after receipt of the United Arab Republic request, and the Advisory Committee was thus quickly informed of the decision which the Secretary General had in mind to convey in his reply to the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic. As indicated in the report to the Security Council of 28 May 1957:

"The Committee did not move, as it was its right to do under the terms of paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) to request the convening of the General Assembly on the situation which had arisen." (S/5704, para. 4)

38. Before consulting the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F., the Secretary General also consulted the permanent representatives of the seven countries providing the contingents of U.N.E.F., and informed them of his intentions. This, in fact, was more than was formally required by the Secretary General in the way of consultation.

39. Obviously, many Governments were concerned about the withdrawal of the Force. It was not possible to consult all of the interested representatives within any reasonable time. This was an emergency situation requiring prompt action. However, the Secretary General was fully aware of the fact that the Force was a multinational force, and that the withdrawal of the Force would have a serious impact on the situation. He was therefore sure to produce sharply divided views among the members of the Security Council. Such sharply divided views would have complicated and exacerbated the situation, and, far from relieving the Secretary General of the responsibility for the decision, they would have made the decision much more difficult to take.

40. It has been said that the final decision on the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. should have been taken only after consultation by the General Assembly. This position is not only incorrect but also unrealistic. In resolution 1000 (ES-I), the General Assembly established a United Nations command for an emergency international force. On the basis of that resolution the force was quickly recruited and its forward movement toward the staging area at Naples, Italy, though established, it had to await the permission of the Government of Egypt to enter Egyptian territory. This permission was subsequently given by the Government of Egypt. The result of these discussions between Secretary General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt is set forth in the official language documents on the basis of which any case could be made that there was any limitation on the Secretary General's Government of Egypt to rescind that consent at its pleasure, or which would indicate that the United Arab Republic had in any way surrendered its right to ask for and obtain at any time the removal of U.N.E.F. from its territory. This point is elaborated later in this report (see para. 71-80 below).

41. As a practical matter, there would be little point in any case in taking such an issue to the General Assembly unless there would be reasonable certainty that that body could be expected expeditiously to reach a substantive decision. In the prevailing circumstances, the question could have been decided by the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. could have been decided by the Assembly more than a year after the Secretary General's withdrawal of the Force from the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary General was, therefore, justified in his decision to withdraw the Force from the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

42. As regards the practical possibility

of the Assembly considering the request for U.N.E.F.'s withdrawal, it is relevant to observe that the next regular session of the General Assembly was some four months off at the time the withdrawal request was made. The special session of the General Assembly which was meeting at the time could have considered the question, according to rule 19 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, only if two-thirds of its members voted for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. It is questionable, to say the least, whether the necessary support could have been garnered for such a controversial item. There could have been no emergency special session since the issue was not then before the Security Council and therefore the condition of lack of unanimity did not exist.

43. As far as consultation with action by the Security Council was concerned, the Secretary General reported to the Council on the situation leading up to and created by the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. on 19 May 1957 (S/5706). In that report he characterized the situation in the Near East as "extremely serious." The Council met for the first time after this report on 24 May 1957, but took no action.

44. As has already been stated, the Advisory Committee did not make any recommendation on the matter. The Secretary General, however, and no representative of any Member Government requested a meeting of either the Security Council or the General Assembly immediately following the Secretary General's report to the Council (S/5706 and S/5707). In this situation, the Secretary General himself did not believe that any useful purpose would be served by his seeking a meeting of either organ, nor did he consider that there was basis for him to do so at that time. Furthermore, the information available to the Secretary General did not lead him to believe that either the General Assembly or the Security Council would have decided that U.N.E.F. should remain on United Arab Republic territory, by force if necessary, despite the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic that it should leave.

Practical Factors Influencing the Decision

45. Since it is still contended in some quarters that the U.N.E.F. operation should somehow have continued after the consent of the Government of the United Arab Republic to its presence was withdrawn, it is necessary to consider the factors, quite apart from considerations of legal validity, which would have made such a course of action entirely impracticable.

46. The content and active cooperation of the host country is essential to the effective operation and, indeed, to the very existence of any United Nations peace-keeping operation of the nature of U.N.E.F. The fact is that U.N.E.F. had been deployed on Egyptian and Egyptian-controlled territory for over 10 1/2 years with the consent and cooperation of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Although it was envisaged in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions that U.N.E.F. would be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel exercised its sovereign right to remove U.N.E.F. from its side, and the force throughout its existence was stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the line only.

47. In these circumstances, the true basis for U.N.E.F.'s existence was the consent and cooperation of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Throughout its existence, a voluntary undertaking by local United Arab Republic authorities to maintain the Force, and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.


48. 5 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1001 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international force and authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

49. 11 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1002 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

50. 12 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1003 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

51. 13 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1004 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

52. 14 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1005 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.



U.N.E.F. AT ONCE LOST ALL USEFULNESS: The U.N. flag was lowered May 19 at Kings Gate checkpoint on road between Gaza and Tel Aviv.

Legal and Constitutional Considerations and the Question of Consent for the Stationing of U.N.E.F. on United Arab Republic Territory

53. Legal and constitutional considerations were, of course, of great importance in determining the Secretary General's decision to station U.N.E.F. on the territory of the Government of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. Since again, a chronology of the relevant actions in 1956 and 1957 may be helpful.

54. 4 November 1956. The General Assembly, at its first emergency special session in Resolution 998 (ES-I), requested the Secretary General to submit to it within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the national concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.

55. 4 November 1956. The General Assembly, in its Resolution 1000 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international force and authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

56. 5 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1001 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

57. 6 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1002 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

58. 7 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1003 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

59. 8 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1004 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

60. 9 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1005 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

61. 10 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1006 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

62. 11 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1007 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

63. 12 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1008 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

64. 13 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1009 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

65. 14 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1010 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

66. 15 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1011 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

67. 16 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1012 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

68. 17 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1013 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

69. 18 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1014 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

70. 19 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1015 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

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72. 21 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1017 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

73. 22 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1018 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

74. 23 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1019 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

75. 24 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1020 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

76. 25 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1021 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

77. 26 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1022 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

78. 27 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1023 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

79. 28 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1024 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

80. 29 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1025 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

81. 30 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1026 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

82. 1 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1027 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

83. 2 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1028 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

84. 3 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1029 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

85. 4 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1030 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

86. 5 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1031 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

87. 6 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1032 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

88. 7 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1033 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

89. 8 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1034 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

90. 9 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1035 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

91. 10 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1036 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

92. 11 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1037 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

93. 12 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1038 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

94. 13 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1039 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

95. 14 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1040 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

96. 15 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1041 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

97. 16 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1042 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

98. 17 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1043 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

99. 18 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1044 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

100. 19 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1045 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

101. 20 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1046 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

102. 21 December 1956. The General Assembly, by its Resolution 1047 (ES-I), authorized the Secretary General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

The Proceedings in the United Nations

YESTERDAY

General Assembly
Held sessions at Ahmed Hassan
Personal representatives of the King
of Morocco; Foreign Minister Adnan
M. Pashat of Iraq; Chief Anthony
Barnes of Nigeria; Foreign Minister
Nicanor Costa Mendez of Argentina;
Mac Johnston of Finland; Adnan
Abby Farah of Somalia; Deputy
Prime Minister Frank Ailes of Ire-
land; Jale Ceviz of Turkey; Avni
Ismail and Joseph Ben Aboum of
Zanzibar.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Continued examination of conditions
in New Guinea

SCHEDULED FOR TODAY

(Comm 28, 1967)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Meets at 10:30 A.M. and 8 P.M.